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**In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts**


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
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INTRODUCTION

Most average Americans probably can not locate the African country of Chad on a map and really, why should they be able to do so? With the exception of a very occasional mention of Chad in the press or on the television, there is very little chance to have it brought to our attention. Chad is one of the least developed and poorest states on the planet.

Chad became independent from France in 1960 and within five years, a civil war had begun. Several countries in the region had an interest in the outcome of the civil war and supported their favored faction. These countries included Egypt, Sudan, and Libya. Other African countries, of course, were greatly concerned with the events in Chad but did not become involved nearly as much as the countries mentioned above. The French too, were very concerned with the situation in Chad and acted to protect their interests.

In 1981 the United States, worried about the situation in Chad, began to funnel covert aid to its favored faction which was led by Hissein Habré. Since then, millions of dollars have been spent to influence the outcome of the civil war and to bolster the current government led by Hissein Habré. What were the motives for United States intervention in Chad? The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons for United States intervention in the Chadian Civil War.

What is intervention? When most people hear of intervention they probably think of military intervention, or sending in troops. Yet, intervention may include many more options other than just sending in the troops. Before delving into the reasons for United States intervention in the Chadian Civil War, one must consider what is intervention.

"Policy-makers plan interventions, nations sustain them, international organizations debate them, citizens ponder them."¹ To understand this intervention in Chad, it is necessary to examine the word and its meaning. Intervention comes from the root word intervene, meaning to go between two events. To intervene in another state's activities is to try and compel, alter, or influence it in some way. Causes for intervention may be based on moral principles, legal precedents, or strategic motives. There are many forms of intervention and these may be acted out through the military, propaganda, economics, diplomacy, ideology, and/or customs. Foreign aid has been classified as a form of intervention. Even taking no action at all may be considered a form of intervention.²

¹James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 no. 2 (June 1969): 160.

²Ibid., 149-69. Rosenau's article cites references for each of the forms of intervention listed above. The point made here is that intervention has many different forms and that it takes place for different reasons.

To determine the reasons for United States intervention in Chad, it would be important to know its interests in Africa. Some of these interests are contained in United States foreign policy. During a January, 1984 speech, Secretary of State George Schultz clearly outlined United States policy in Africa. He said:

First, we have a significant and geopolitical stake in the security of the continent and the seas surrounding it. Off its shores lie important trade routes, including those carrying most of the energy resources needed by our European allies. We are affected when Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans seek to expand their influence on the continent by force, to the detriment of both African independence and Western interests.

Second, Africa is part of the global economic system. If Africa's economics are in trouble, the reverberations are felt here. Our exports to Africa have dropped by fifty percent in the last three years; American financial institutions have felt the pinch of African inability to repay loans. And Africa is a major source of raw materials crucial to the world economy.

Third, Africa is important to us politically because the nations of Africa are now major players in world diplomacy. They comprise nearly one-third of the membership of the United Nations, where they form the most cohesive voting bloc in the General Assembly.

Finally, Africa is important to us, most of all in human terms. Eleven percent of America's population traces its roots to Africa; all of us live in a society profoundly influenced by this human and cultural heritage.³

Although this excerpt came from Secretary Schultz's speech made after United States intervention began in Chad, it is relevant to this study. Here he outlined United States

³Elliott P. Skinner, ed., Beyond Constructive Engagement: United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1986), 7.

interests in Africa and it is from this big picture that one may consider reasons for intervention.

Is it that Chad is important to United States interests in Africa? Why did the United States wait some fifteen years to intervene with military aid for one of the factions in the Chadian Civil War? Could it be that the intervention was based on the "security of Western interests in Africa or the importance of Africa to Western security"? Intervention and security of Western interests in Africa during this time period must be considered in the view of an East-West confrontation and in terms of regional politics.⁴

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the reason(s) for United States intervention into the Chadian Civil War. It is the contention of this study that the United States intervened to oppose Libyan intervention, to react to Libyan terrorism and destabilization policies, to support allies in the region, and to counter Soviet expansion. In effect, this study is concerned with reasons that have a global significance, rather than a strictly African or Chadian one.

Because the definition of intervention is so broad and may include diplomacy or even taking no actions at all, this study is concerned with United States intervention with military aid. This thesis examines reasons for the United States beginning covert and overt military aid to Chad and

⁴S.N. MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security in Africa," International Affairs 60 no. 1 (Winter 1983/84): 53-73.

continuing this support for the Chadian government of Hissein Habré. The time period discussed will primarily be the civil war years of 1965 to 1987. Emphasis is on the period just a few years before and after the United States intervention in 1981.

This study begins with a chapter on the historical setting, giving the background to the situation in Chad. The next chapter examines Libya as a cause of intervention and discusses why Libya created concern in the region and to the United States. The global aspect of this study follows with consideration given to the Soviet threat. The last chapter looks at other possible reasons for the intervention, which include minerals and oil. Lastly, the conclusion is an attempt at ordering the reasons in a hierarchy and making some final comments.

CHAPTER ONE

The Chadian Civil War: An Historical Setting

Chad is the fifth largest African country with about five million people and a \$150 per capita GNP. It is the second poorest and one of the least developed countries in the world.¹ This former colony of French Equatorial Africa has a population that varies as much as its topography. Created by the colonial powers through events in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,² Chad's boundaries combine a vast area with many differences. One French observer described Chad as 'an historical accident'.³

It seems as though this one country was formed without regard to the multitude of differences that existed within its boundaries, just as most African countries were formed. These differences are behind the start of Chad's long Civil War. René Lemarchand, a well-published political science professor on Chad and Libya, began his statement before the 1981 Subcommittee on Africa hearing on the Libya-Sudan-Chad

¹World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989), 221.

²The events referred to are the colonial powers' scramble to occupy large portions of Africa, the International Congress of Berlin in 1884-5, and the Fashoda incident in 1898. France struggled for Chad because it tied together French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.

³Christian Bouquet, Tchad: Genèse d'un Conflit (Paris: éditions L'Harmattan, 1982), 80.

situation by stating that, "Chad is not so much a state as it is an institutionalized basket case."⁴ Later, in an article, he said that it is "only by legal fiction or diplomatic courtesy [that] Chad can be described as a state."⁵ In effect, the differences within the country and its civil war did not give Chad the appearance of a country.


DIFFERENCES

Chad is comprised of three climatic regions (see Map 1). The northern region, and the largest of the three, is part of the Sahara desert. It is primarily occupied by nomadic groups. The central region is the Sahel. The people who live there are primarily semi-nomadic and sedentary groups. They combine some crop production with livestock production. The southern region, primarily populated by sedentary groups, is subtropical and is the major crop producing region. This is the most densely populated region of Chad. On the western border of Chad is Lake Chad, which provides the country with its small fishing industry.

⁴Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October and 4 November 1981, 27.

⁵Gerald Bender, James Coleman, and Richard Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), 241.

Map 1
Climatic Regions of Chad



(Source: Harold D. Nelson, Margarita Dobert, Gordon C. MacDonald, James McLaughlin, Barbara J. Mavin, and Philip W. Moeller, Chad: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1980; sixth printing, 1985), 13.)

The diversity of the ethnic groups of Chad with their one hundred plus languages adds to the geographical differences. There is no dominant ethnic group in numbers. Chart 1 shows the diversity of the peoples and the proportion of the population they make up by region.⁶

The numbers shown on Chart 1 for ethnic group populations do not mean that these groups form cohesive units. Often the bond within the group only extends to the village level. What does bond these groups, though, is their way of life, whether it is nomadic, semi-nomadic, fisherman, or farmer. Religion may also serve as somewhat of a bonding element. In Chad the population is about fifty percent Muslim, forty-three percent animist, and seven percent Christian.⁷ The northern part of Chad is predominantly Islamic while the southern part is dominated by the Christianized Sara ethnic group.

Another factor to consider is the slave raiding that took place from the beginning of Chad's recorded history until the French ended it in the early twentieth century. Slave raiders from the Arab north would go into the Black African regions

⁶Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in Chad," Journal of Modern African Studies 18, no. 1 (1980): 28. Decalo footnoted this chart by stating that the totals do not always add up due to rounding off the numbers. Also, there were about 60,000 Europeans equaling about 1.4 percent of the population. Although Decalo did not say, it appears that this group was probably listed under "other ethnic groups".

⁷Ibid., 26.

Chart 1

Chad: Ethnic Breakdown, 1974 Estimates

	Numbers	Percentage
Southern Sedentary Groups	1,517,000	36.2
Sara	1,066,000	25.4
Mboum, Laka	149,000	3.5
Moundang	120,000	2.9
Toubouri	100,000	2.4
Massa	66,000	1.6
Others	16,000	0.4
Sedentary and Semi-Nomadic Groups of the Sahel	1,202,000	28.6
Maba	226,000	5.4
Bulala, Kuka	106,000	2.5
Haddad	130,000	3.1
Dadjo	87,000	2.1
Massalit	64,000	1.5
Moubi	33,000	0.8
Zaghawa	53,000	1.3
Hadjeray	116,000	2.8
Kanembu	80,000	1.9
Boudouma	26,000	0.6
Barma	47,000	1.1
Others	234,000	5.6
Nomadic Groups	823,000	19.6
Toubou	161,000	3.8
Arabs	620,000	14.8
Fulani	42,000	1.0
Other Ethnic Groups	657,000	15.6
Total	4,200,000	100.0

(Source: Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in Chad," Journal of Modern African Studies 18, no. 1 (1980): 28.)

and capture people to sell. These slaves were taken by the caravans to markets in the north of the continent. The Arab north may have carried some animosity toward the Black southern controlled government that took over after independence. The same could have worked the other way as well.⁸

ECONOMY

Agriculture is the primary occupation and revenue earner for the country. Cotton, the crop that was introduced forcibly to Chad in the early 1950's by French officials, has become the country's largest crop and primary source of revenue. Chad's \$98.6 million of exports in 1986 consisted of agricultural products.⁹ Seventy percent of the population is rural,¹⁰ with most of these people involved in subsistence farming. Chart 2 gives an indication of Chad's low level of mechanization and their reliance on animals.

⁸Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in Chad," Journal of Modern African Studies 18, no. 1 (1980): 26-30.

⁹Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, The World Factbook 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 46.

¹⁰World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa, 278.

Chart 2

Mechanization and Animal Reliance in Chad

	<u>1975</u>	<u>'80</u>	<u>'83</u>	<u>'86</u>
<u>Machinery</u> (#)				
Tractors	130	160	160	160
Combines	15	17	17	17
<u>Livestock</u> (Thousand head)				
Cattle	-	4250	4672	5017
Horses	-	152	155	150
Asses	-	255	255	255

(Source: United Nations, Department of International, Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 1985/86 Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1988), 380, 403, 407.)

Chad's industrial sector is almost entirely based on agricultural production. The poor human and physical infrastructure hurts any potential foreign investment. The domestic market is not only poor but small. Major cities, with their mid 1980 populations, are: N'Djamena, the capital, formerly named Fort-Lamy, 600,000; Sahr, formerly Fort Archambault, 100,000; Mondou, 90,000; and Abéché, 70,000¹¹ (see Map 1). Life expectancy is forty-six years, the daily caloric supply in 1986 was 1,716¹², and finally, in Chad the literacy rate is seventeen percent.¹³

¹¹Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, Africa (New York: Worldmark Press, Ltd., 1988), 61.

¹²World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa, 221, 276. The recommended daily caloric supply is 2,500 for a man and 2,000 for a woman. In 1965, the average caloric supply in Chad was 2,399.

¹³CIA, The World Factbook 1988, 46.

The physical infrastructure is very poor. There are no railroads and only four permanent hard surfaced airports. The road situation is very bad, with 31,322 kilometers of roads, and only thirty-two kilometers paved! The Chari river is navigable, but does not flow to the ocean, only to Lake Chad. A telephone system exists that links the cities and capital to other African capitals and Paris. There are only 5,000 telephones, one FM, and three AM radio stations in Chad.¹⁴

Oil was discovered in the mid 1970's, but production and other exploration ceased about 1980 due to the war and falling world oil prices. Also, traces of the radioactive elements uranium and thorium were discovered, along with other elements. Although there may be some promise in these discoveries, no real production has yet developed.¹⁵ One of the main hindrances of continued exploration and production was the civil war.

¹⁴CIA, The World Factbook 1988, 46.

¹⁵Mineral and oil potential are discussed in Chapter Four.

CHAD'S CIVIL WAR

Chad's civil war began in 1965 and ended, hopefully, in 1987.¹⁶ The war broke out as a riot between peasants and tax collectors in the central region of Chad. The conflict developed into a north versus south situation, with the Arab peoples of the north against the Blacks of the South, who controlled the government. This tax collection was seen as an attempt by the southern-led government to extend its control over the north which had been traditionally left alone.

For the next twenty plus years the balance of power shifted between north and south and between the groups within the north and south of Chad. Intervention from other countries, primarily France, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan, kept the war going as the other countries tried to have their favored faction gain control. The history of the civil war is long and recounting it fully does not serve the purpose of the paper. It is necessary to abbreviate this history to develop the situation leading to the United States' intervention with military aid.

¹⁶A truce has been in effect since Libya was forced out of Chad in 1987. Actually, the Libyans still occupy the Aozou Strip, which includes the Libyan-built military base on the border of Libya and the Aozou Strip. Libya has occupied the Aozou Strip since 1973. Fighting between the factions could, of course, start again if Habré's government does not successfully consolidate the country and ease the differences.

François (Ngarta) Tombalbaye, a southern Sara (see Chart 1), Protestant, and former school teacher, became Chad's first president after independence in 1960. He banned all opposing political parties and arrested or purged his political opponents from the government and/or the country. Rioting resulted when the government purged the northern politicians. Then came the bloody tax riots in northern Chad in 1965 that are considered the beginning of the civil war.

With the tax revolt came the formation of the National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) in 1966 by Chadian politicians in exile. They received support from Chadians who had moved to Libya and Sudan. Their headquarters was located initially in Algiers and later moved to Tripoli.

A large group of the exiled Chadians in Libya were the Toubou who fled Chad with their Derde, or religious leader (see Chart 1 for the Toubou population estimate). The name Toubou translates to "inhabitants of tu", the people from the Tibesti mountains. They occupy an area that includes the Fezzan province of Libya, into northeastern Niger, to the Saharan section of Chad. In Chad, Toubou are found further south, in a line from Lake Chad eastward to the area of Abéché (see Map 1). Some of the Toubou belong to the Sennusiya Brotherhood which was a religious order that expanded southward from the Cyrenaica province in Libya.¹⁷

¹⁷Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad (Metuchen, New Jersey and London: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977), 277-8.

It is from the Toubou that two prominent national figures emerged; they were Hissein Habré and Goukouni Oueddei. Habré was from the Daza and Oueddei from the Teda subgroup of the Toubou. Hissein Habré was educated in Paris as a lawyer and returned to Chad in 1971. He initially worked for the government, but defected to FROLINAT.¹⁸ Habré had Marxist beliefs.¹⁹ Once in FROLINAT he became the commander of its Second Liberation Army in the Tibesti area. His number two man was Goukouni Oueddei, the only remaining son of the Derde.²⁰

In 1968, President Tombalbaye asked for and received French troops to help put down a revolt started by the Toubou in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture (see Map 2). The revolt was crushed in 1971. France also assisted in re-organizing the government which included representation by the Arabs. In 1971, the government claimed it had foiled an attempted coup by people influenced by Libya.²¹ It is not clear if this was an attempt by President Tombalbaye to keep


¹⁸For a discussion of Habré's defection, see Michael P. Kelley, A State in Disarray: Conditions of Chad's Survival (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1986), 12.

¹⁹Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, 192-3, 214 and Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad," 42 indicates Habré was Marxist. There was no mention of Habré's current belief.

²⁰Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, 192-3, 214. These two men became rivals and each became the leader of Chad by force.

²¹Nelson, et al., Chad: A Country Study, 129.

Map 2
Chad's Prefectures



(Source: Nelson, Chad: A Country Study, XIV.)

pressure on the Arab-Chadians or if it was indeed a coup attempt.²²

With the conflict over, the French Foreign Legion withdrew from Chad in 1972. In 1973 the Libyans moved into the Aozou Strip. President Tombalbaye supposedly agreed to give the Aozou Strip to Libya in exchange for Libya stopping all support for FROLINAT.²³ Although this is widely believed, there is no definite proof.

President Tombalbaye was assassinated in 1975 in a military coup that installed General Felix Malloum, a southerner, as President.²⁴ General Malloum attempted to unite the country through his policies of national reconciliation, but it was to no avail. One significant event during General Malloum's reunification attempts was Habré's joining the government. Habré became the Chadian prime minister.

How did Habré come to join the government? In April, 1974, Habré's Second Army kidnapped several Europeans, one of which was Françoise Claustre, a French woman. The Claustre affair gained international coverage and brought Habré's name

²²John Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara (Totawa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1989), 129.

²³Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad 1977, 37-8.

²⁴Kelley, A State in Disarray, 23. In a footnote, Kelley claims that the military coup was in response to President Tombalbaye's attempt to control the military by a succession of arrests in 1974 and 1975.

to the forefront.²⁵ Oueddei disagreed with Habré over the handling of the Claustre affair. But this was not the main issue that divided the two. Oueddei wanted to use Libyan support to gain control of the country while Habré opposed the idea and was also totally against Libya's occupation of the Aozou Strip.²⁶

The result was that Oueddei and his followers denounced Habré as the commander of FROLINAT'S Second Army in 1977. Habré and his followers then became known as the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) and Oueddei's group as the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP). Oueddei had Libya negotiate the release of Françoise Claustre. Habré was forced to seek assistance from Egypt and Sudan. General Malloum's government was supported by Egypt and Sudan and this explains Habré's uniting with the government.²⁷

In 1978, Habré united with Malloum's government. Oueddei's Libyan backed forces moved toward the capital and the French sent in troops and stopped Oueddei's forces. Early

²⁵This incident is known as the Claustre Affair even though there were other hostages. Mme. Claustre was the last to be released and thus apparently the reason for the event being named the Claustre affair. Also kidnapped was Christophe Staewen, a cousin to West Germany's President Gustave Heineman. Staewen's wife was killed during the raid that took the Europeans hostage. See Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, 142-3.

²⁶René Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 116.

²⁷Ibid.

in 1979 Malloum and Habré split, the government fell apart, and Habré and his FAN seized the capital. Neighboring countries and warring Chadian factions attempted to bring Chad together. Other countries' interests interfered with the peace process. In late 1979, eleven armed factions met and formed the Gouvernement d'Union Nationale Transitoire (GUNT). This, too, fell apart.²⁸

During the summer of 1980, Habré and Oueddei signed a mutual defense treaty. Then Oueddei's FAP moved toward N'Djamena. The French withdrew to stay out of factional fighting. Oueddei and his Libyan backed forces captured the capital in December, 1980.²⁹ Habré and some of his forces fled to Cameroon, while other FAN troops fled to eastern Chad and Sudan.

Chad's neighbors, France, and the United States were alarmed over Libya's actions in Chad and Qadhafi's proposed merger of Chad and Libya. France massed troops on the Central African Republic's border and, at the same time, President Mitterand worked on convincing Oueddei to distance himself from Libya. The ploy was successful, and in November, 1981 Libya withdrew to the Aozou Strip³⁰ and an Organization of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping force deployed.

²⁸Kelley, A State in Disarray, 68-73.

²⁹Ibid., 17.

³⁰This Libyan withdrawal may have been an attempt by Qadhafi to gain support for his chairing the OAU in 1982.

The OAU peacekeeping force consisted of 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire. These countries were opposed to Libyan expansion. The United States provided \$12 million for airlift and non-lethal equipment to support the OAU mission.³¹

The OAU peacekeeping force failed to keep the peace.³² The result was that on 7 June 1982, Habré's forces took over N'Djamena and Oueddei, with his GUNT, fled. Habré was able to conduct his offensive from Sudan with aid provided by Egypt and Sudan. He had one more backer this time; it was the United States.³³

In 1983, Oueddei, supported by Libyan military forces and equipment, began another offensive in Chad. After Habré had lost control of the northern half of Chad and the collapse of his government appeared imminent, French forces came in to stabilize the situation under Operation Manta. The Libyans were stopped, and the country was divided roughly along the sixteenth parallel.

³¹Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes, Chad (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 5.

³²It would be interesting to know if the OAU peacekeeping force really meant to keep the peace. The countries making up the force surely wanted to see Qadhafi's influence reduced.

³³The United States not only helped fund the OAU mission, but supported Habré with aid for military purposes. This apparently undermined the usefulness of the OAU peacekeeping force. United States' assistance to Habré is discussed later in this chapter.

During this stalemate, Oueddei and Qadhafi began having their differences. Qadhafi ordered Oueddei arrested, and in the process Oueddei was wounded. The result was that the majority of the rebels changed to side with Habré in late 1986. The Chadian army now made progress in the war. Libyan forces were crushed at Fada and Ouadi Doum on 19 and 22 March 1987 in "the biggest desert battles since the Second World War."³⁴ Libyan forces pulled back into the Aozou Strip and the war with Libya ended.

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

United States intervention definitely helped Habré capture N'Djamena in 1982 and to drive the Libyans out of Chad in 1987. With United States support, Habré was able to take control of Chad. This support included United States equipment, weapons, ammunition, money, humanitarian aid, training, and satellite information.³⁵

Without a doubt, the Reagan administration, 1981-1988, started military aid to Habré. Before discussing that, it is necessary to note that the Carter administration, 1977-1980, provided an initial increase in the amount of official

³⁴Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 119 as quoted from Africa Confidential 28, no. 2.

³⁵Colin Legum, ed. African Contemporary Record 19 (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, a division of Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1988), B194. See also Jonathan C. Randal, "Litter of Libyan Retreat Strewn Across Chadian Desert," Washington Post (13 April 1987): A18.

development assistance (ODA). The following chart shows the amounts of ODA from the United States to Chad just before and during the Carter Presidency.³⁶

Chart 3

U.S. ODA to Chad as a Percentage
of Total Chad ODA Receipts, 1975-1980
(in Thousands of U.S. dollars)

Year	U.S. ODA to Chad (a)	Total Chad ODA Receipts (b)	%a/b
1975	2,530	71,556	3.5
1976	3,170	115,652	2.7
1977	13,288	86,714	15.3
1978	19,715	182,940	10.8
1979	10,107	67,895	14.3
1980	1,160	35,682	3.3

(Source: Kelley, A State in Disarray, 117 as cited by the Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel, Club du Sahel, L'Aide Publique au Développement dans les Pays Membres du CILSS, Annual Reports 1975-1980, Club du Sahel/OCDE, Paris.)

Note that 1977 marked a dramatic increase in ODA to Chad. This took place when Libyan support to Chadian rebels was apparent. This same year was the Egyptian-Libyan four day war. It also coincided with an increase in Soviet activities in Africa.³⁷ In 1978, the United States stated that Chad was eligible to purchase United States arms and receive arms-

³⁶Kelley, A State in Disarray, 117.

³⁷Ibid., 114-5.

transfers from third countries. This undoubtedly meant that countries such as Egypt and Sudan could transfer arms.³⁸ This is when Habré and Malloum formed a coalition government.

The years 1976 through 1980 accounted for one billion dollars of United States' military assistance spent on North African countries. This was largely due to Libyan actions. This was a significant increase from the seventy-seven million dollars spent from 1971 through 1975. During the same years, United States assistance was about three times higher for Africa South of the Sahara. It was \$400 million. But none of this military assistance was slated for Chad.³⁹

United States military aid began with the 1981 approval by President Reagan for several million dollars of covert money to be transferred through the CIA to Habré.⁴⁰ Other support included equipment, weapons, and ammunition at no charge. Before discussing the reasons for intervening with military assistance, the type of assistance will be described.

Information from the United States Army Material Command indicates the United States Security Assistance programs for

³⁸Kelley, A State in Disarray, 115 as cited in the Department of State Bulletin, 12 May 1978.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Books, a division of Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1987), 91. René Lemarchand in his chapter titled "The Case of Chad" in The Green and the Black stated on page 118 that the covert aid to Habré from the CIA was estimated at \$10 million.

Chad began in 1983.⁴¹ This was within two years of covert aid being started to Habré and just after Habré captured N'Djamena. These programs fall into three categories: 1) the Military Assistance Program (MAP), 2) International Military Education and Training (IMET), and 3) Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

MAP materials and services since 1983 to mid 1990 amount to fifty-two million dollars. All of these materials and services were delivered. MAP assistance included eighty-two - 2 1/2 ton trucks, twenty - 1/4 ton trucks (jeeps), and thirty-three MK19 grenade launchers.⁴²

IMET spending from 1983 to 1990 was \$1.1 million. This figure includes \$300 thousand for 1990. This money was used for several different activities.⁴³ These activities included nine mobile training teams: 1) one vehicle maintenance team, 2) one supply team, 3) four TOW anti-tank weapon teams, 4) one High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) - the armed

⁴¹Correspondence from Mr. Len Collins, Country Program Manager, United States Army Material Command, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 33444-0001.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

forces' replacement for the jeep, and 5) two teams with classified missions.⁴⁴

In addition to the training teams, there was military and English language assistance provided to the Chadians. This education included sending Chadians to the U.S. Army schools. Training was provided at the Army's Ordinance, Infantry, Quartermaster, Engineer, and Signal schools. An English language laboratory was set up in Chad and is now operated by the Chadians to teach them the English language prior to attending U.S. military schools. Other lower level courses were provided.⁴⁵

FMS to Chad until mid 1990 was \$19,177,534. These sales included the items listed in Chart 4.⁴⁶

Other assistance provided to Chad came in the form of three C-130A aircraft delivered about 1986. One of these already crashed. The Chadian government purchased two C-130H aircraft. This purchase was made with cash from the sale of equipment captured from Libya.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Phone conversation at 1400 hours, 13 August 1990 with Mrs. Meredith Martin, Program Manager for the Security Assistance Training and Fielding Activity (SATFA) of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This conversation was arranged by Mr. Schnurr, Deputy of SATFA.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Correspondence with Mr. Len Collins.

⁴⁷Interview at 1100 hours, 27 July 1990, with Mrs. Kate Pappalardo, [Air Force] Country Manager for Africa South of the Sahara, at the International Logistic Center, Building 210, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.

Chart 4

FMS SALES TO CHAD

Item	Quantity
90 mm Heat-T Ctg	750
Mine detectors AN/PSS-11	12
Night vision devices	70
AN/PVS-2A, AN/PVS-5A	
Recoilless rifle 106mm	30
MK 19 rifles w/mounts	24
Fuel trucks M49A2C	2
Wreckers 5T, M816	2
Grenade launcher M79	400
Redeye trainers M76	5
Redeye field handling set	4
Machine gun M2	10
LAWs	600
V150 armored cars	11
2-1/2 ton trucks	144
1/4 ton truck M151A2	98
Redeye	289
1/4 ton truck M825	41
1/4 ton ambulance M718	6
TOW launcher	10
I-TOW missile	50
Air Defense Missile	200
M988 HMMWV Trucks	20
M14 Rifles	2,000
7.62 mm Ammo	3,000,000

(Source: Correspondence with Mr. Len Collins, Country Program Manager, United States Army Material Command.)

This chapter has primarily discussed the events in Chad and the type of military aid the United States provided to Habré. The next chapters are a discussion of reasons for the United States intervening in this conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

Libya: A Motive for United States Intervention

The most apparent reason for United States intervention in Chad was to counter the intervention of Qadhafi's Libya. But what was it about Libya that caused such great concern within the United States government? This chapter examines Libya's threats to the region such as terrorism, destabilization policies, and expansionism. Because the difference between Libyan terrorism and destabilization activities is often difficult to distinguish, this thesis reviews them together.

TERRORISM AND DESTABILIZATION POLICIES

Libyan sponsored terrorism was not only a regional concern, but an international concern in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In a report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency titled Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, it was stated that "the government of Colonel Qadhafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism. Qadhafi's major goals involve the Middle East, and Africa, particularly the destruction of Israel, the advancement of the Palestinian

cause, and the overthrow of conservative and moderate Arab states."¹

Richard T. Kennedy, Under-Secretary of State for Management, before a hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding international terrorism, stated that:

1980 was a record year for international terrorism. There were 760 international terrorist acts, resulting in more casualties than any year since the U.S. government began keeping statistics on terrorism in 1968; 642 people were killed in international terrorists attacks last year, 1,078 were wounded. Ten Americans were among the dead; 94 Americans were injured.

The statistics in 1980 reflect the trend over the past few years toward increasing death and injury from terrorist violence. Of the 760 acts, 278 or 38 percent were directed against Americans or American property.²

Mr. Kennedy went on to quote a statement by President Reagan on 27 January 1981 - "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retaliation."³

¹Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1981), 9.

²Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Terrorism: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 10 June 1981, 32.

³Ibid., 46.

Libyan terrorists' projects are well documented. They do not only occur in Africa, but also in the West. A list of some of Libya's terrorists' ties follows.⁴

- In 1972, Libya provided sanctuary to the perpetrators of the Munich Olympics murders.
- Qadhafi gave refuge to the terrorists who had taken 60 hostages at the 1975 Vienna OPEC meeting.
- The Venezuelan terrorist, "Carlos" has operated out of Libya for some years, despite Qadhafi's denials.
- At various times, Qadhafi has supported the Irish Republican Army as well as Corsican, Basque, and other violent European separatists.
- Weapons found on various European terrorists, for example, Brequet and Kopp in 1982, had been sold to the Libyan army. In April 1983, the Swiss Government expelled the Libyan charge d'affaires for supplying arms to two convicted Swiss terrorists.
- In April 1983, Libya took eight German technicians hostage in order to blackmail West Germany into releasing Libyans charged with violent crime.
- In June 1983, the Libyan envoy to Jordan defected and revealed Qadhafi's plan to use missiles to destroy the aircraft carrying King Hussein.

The Reagan administration came into office in January, 1981 as tensions were high with Libya. Increased tensions were highlighted by Libya's assassination plot on the U.S. Ambassador to Cairo, "violent opposition" to Camp David, the air skirmishes with U.S. planes, assassination campaigns

⁴Kenneth Adelman, "Libya: A Source of International Terrorism," Department of State Bulletin 82, no. 2058 (January 1982): 60-1.

against Libyans in the United States, Libyan intervention in Africa, and Libya's attempts to influence U.S. officials.⁵

Chart 5 lists Libyan activities in Africa.

Chart 5

Libyan Activities in Africa

1. Military training and support of anti-regime elements

Target	Date	Type of Operation
Burkina Faso	1982-83	Arms and funding to Colonel Sankara, thus contributing to his successful military take-over (1983)
Chad	1970-86	Arms, funding, and training to FROLINAT, and subsequently to GUNT factions
Gambia	1981	Arms and funding to instigators of abortive coup
Niger	1976	Abortive Libyan-inspired coup
	1982	Abortive raid against Arlit by Libyan-trained Tamchakent element (Touaregs) headed by El Hadj Ami
Mali	1982	Abortive raid against Tarara by Libyan-trained commandos presumably headed by key opposition figure Didi Demba Medina Soumbounu

⁵P. Edward Haley, Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 227-8.

Sudan	1975-85	<p>Military and financial assistance to southern-based rebellion</p> <p>Recruitment of Sudanese elements into the Libyan Islamic Legion; training in Libya and subsequent involvement in Chad</p> <p>Abortive Libyan-sponsored coups against Numeiri in 1975, 1976, and 1983</p>
Tunisia	1980	Raid on Gafsa by Libyan-trained Tunisian "dissidents"
	1982	Raid on Kasserine by Libyan-trained Tunisian "dissidents"
	1984	Libyan-inspired sabotage of pipeline near Libyan-Tunisian border
Somalia	1978-85	Military and financial support to Somali Salvation Front
Western Sahara	1976-84	Military and financial support to Polisario
Zaire	1976-86	<p>Financial support to National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and Congolese National Movement</p> <p>Plot against Mobuto</p>

2. Direct military intervention on behalf of incumbent regimes

Uganda	1976-79	<p>Approximately 700 Libyan troops sent in as back-up forces to Idi Amin, reinforced by another 300 men plus one Libyan TU-22 supersonic bomber and C-130 transport plane at the time of the Tanzanian invasion (1978-1979); presence of PLO guerrillas fighting on Amin's side attributable to Libya's mediation and funding</p>
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Chad	1980-81	Massive intervention of Libya's Islamic Legion on the side of Goukouni Oueddeye's GUNT during the battle of Ndjamena (December 1980) involving Soviet-supplied T-54 and T-55 tanks, multiple rocket launchers and 81 mm mortars; following the fall of Ndjamena (in December 1980) a Libyan occupation force of an estimated 2,000 moved into Chad, but withdrew in November 1983 when asked to do so by the incumbent President Goukouni Oueddeye.
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3. Direct military interventions on behalf on anti-regime factions against incumbent governments

Egypt	1977	Border war with Egypt
Chad	1973	Libyan troops occupy Aouzou
	1983	Direct intervention of Libyan troops in Faya-Largeau and other localities in support of GUNT "rebels"
	1984-86	Between 3,000 and 5,000 Libyan troops remained on the ground after Libya failed to comply with the terms of the Franco-Libyan mutual withdrawal agreement (1984) intended to serve as back-up for the GUNT rebels; radar installations and Soviet-built Sam-6 anti-aircraft missile sites reported in several localities, including Wadi Doum, approximately 60 miles from Faya

(Source: Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 9-10. This chart was taken in its entirety from this source. The purpose of this chart is to show the extent of Qadhafi's activities in Africa, not to discuss each of his interventions.)

Chad would have been a valuable prize for Libya. Through Chad, Libya would have easier access to more countries for conducting influence and destabilization policies. Chad's borders are: 1,360km with Sudan, 1,175km with Nigeria, 1,197 km with the Central Africa Republic and 1,094 km with Cameroon.⁶ Map 3 depicts African countries that Libya is directly involved with and an approximate dividing line for the predominantly Muslim area of Africa.

1980 was a rough year for Libya's foreign policy because of its "increasing aggressive and militant international actions." The United States and many African and Middle Eastern countries broke ties with Libya or expelled Libyan diplomats. From July, 1980 to January, 1981, the countries of Gabon, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria expelled Libyan diplomats. Senegal and Gambia broke relations with Libya. The Central African Republic, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia also had serious tensions with Libya. Other countries during this time that had major problems in their relations with Libya were Egypt, France, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Uganda, Upper Volta, and of course, the United States.⁷


Libya's foreign policy was counter to United States interests in the region. Qadhafi's actions may not have been on behalf of the Soviet Union, but it did cause great

⁶CIA, The World Factbook 1988, 45.

⁷Haley, Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969, 224-5.

Map 3

Libya's Activities in Africa



(Source: Derived from Ieuan LL. Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs, (London and New York: Methuen and Company, 1984; revised, 1985; reprinted by Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1989), 63.)

concern.⁸ If Chad were to be used as a base, it would increase Libya's opportunities to intervene and topple other African countries. René Lemarchand testified to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 29 October 1981 that "there is a strong fear of Libyan-inspired subversion among Chad's neighbors, not just in Egypt and the Sudan, but also in Niger, Nigeria and the CAR [Central African Republic]."⁹ I. William Zartman, Professor of Political Science at S.A.I.S., John Hopkins University, testified that Libya was also a threat to Mali and Morocco and has claimed a portion of the northeastern corner of Niger. Libyan maps depict parts of Algeria that contain oil as belonging to Libya.¹⁰ The maintenance of the status quo and thus the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union was being jeopardized by Libya.

To protect United States interests, it was necessary to formulate a strategy to contain Libya and, hopefully, to overthrow Qadhafi. The strategy was formed in the early days of the Reagan Administration. It was initially implemented by covert funds through the CIA. There was concern with the possible results of a direct confrontation with Libya, since the United States imported ten percent of its oil from Libya.

⁸The next chapter examines the ties between the Soviet Union and Libya to determine if the Soviet threat was a reason for United States intervention in Chad.

⁹Congress, House, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October and 4 November 1981, 36.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 42.

This oil was important because of its low sulphur content. If Libya were to cut off the oil, it could cause problems on the eastern coast of the United States. The administration also wished to avoid the risk of the Arab world uniting behind Qadhafi.¹¹

Representative Edward Markey stated that it was difficult to be tough on terrorism and buy Libyan oil. During the 1981 Subcommittee hearings, he stated that the United States purchased about 300,000 barrels of oil per day from Libya, which is about forty percent of its production. He said that in 1980 the United States bought seven billion dollars worth of Libyan oil and at the time of this testimony was buying \$11.5 million per day.¹² The point was that the United States was helping finance Libya's activities.

Not only was Qadhafi benefitting from oil revenues, but from hired help such as the former CIA agent, Edward A. Wilson, and some Green Berets that he recruited.¹³ Congress

¹¹Woodward, Veil, 89-90.

¹²Congress, House, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October and 4 November 1981, 76. Following testimony by Robert A. Flaten, Director of the Office of North African Affairs in the Department of State, said the actual figures were about 100-200,000 barrels a day, which equalled about 20-30 percent of Libyan oil exports. Lemarchand said that "Libya is America's third largest oil supplier, and the United States remains the single largest purchaser of Libyan oil. Libyan oil is also the most expensive...[at] \$40.50 a barrel". Ibid., 56.

¹³See Peter Maas, Manhunt (New York: Random House, 1986).

acted to stop United States oil purchases and to restrict and prosecute illegal assistance to Libya.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO ALLIES

Sudan and Egypt, friends and important allies in United States' foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East, saw Libya as a threat. They claimed Libyan expansion in Africa was really Soviet expansion.¹⁴ The main objective of the Libyan intervention was not Chad, they said, but Sudan. Of course, if Sudan were to be lost from the pro-American realm, Egypt would definitely be in trouble. It is for these reasons that Egypt and Sudan requested more aid.¹⁵

As a means of protecting themselves and striking back at Libya, Egypt and Sudan supported Habré. They had a "security interest in supporting Habré."¹⁶ The United States had a security interest in Egypt and Sudan.

By supporting the allies, the United States could protect their interests. Libya was the direct threat to these interests. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated, "Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's 'mischief making' threatens Egypt

¹⁴This Soviet threat is discussed in the next chapter.

¹⁵Michailo V. Stevovic, "Chad and Events Surrounding It," Review of International Affairs 32 (March 1981): 26.

¹⁶Jay Peterzell, Reagan's Secret Wars, CNSS Report No. 108 (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1984), 51.

and Sudan and by extension, the American presence in the Fertile Crescent, Arabia, and the Gulf as well."¹⁷

The United States' strategy to counter Libya's intervention in Chad involved covert support to Hissein Habré to retake control of Chad and then to use Chad as a block to Libyan expansion. Habré had taken refuge in Sudan with some of his forces after Oueddei and the FROLINAT forces, supported by Libya, took N'Djamena. President Jonafer Nimieri of Sudan urged the CIA to support Habré, fearing that Sudan was next on Libya's list to take over. According to a SECRET Special National Intelligence Estimate, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and France were increasing their covert support to Habré.¹⁸

Habré probably knew that his anti-Libyan stance would get him the support he needed. Initially, this support included logistical support from Egypt, technical advisors and equipment from Sudan, and an estimated ten million dollars worth of covert aid through the CIA.¹⁹ France had already spent \$100 million over the years in an attempt to stabilize Chad.²⁰

There was opposition about the selection of Habré to receive the support from the United States. A letter from

¹⁷Michael C. Hudson, "Reagan's Policy in Northeast Africa," Africa Report (March-April 1982): 5.

¹⁸Woodward, Veil, 89.

¹⁹Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 118.

²⁰Woodward, Veil, 165.

the House Intelligence members to President Reagan outlined the opposition to the covert support to Habré. The reasons included Habré's involvement in massacres; stated admiration for Mao, Castro, and Ho Chi Minh; and his once calling for revolution in all of Africa.²¹

Sometimes, it seems that for United States foreign policy "the enemies of our enemies are our friends."²² During the hearings about the Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, Zartman and Lemarchand were asked about Habré as a choice for United States' support. Lemarchand said that "the Habré option is a nonstarter. No other Chadian leader has managed to attract as much hostility from as many factions as Habré." He also disliked U.S. military support for Chad being given to Habré. Zartman stated that he "would certainly agree that support for Habré is wasted support. Habré is not an attractive candidate." He preferred the French policy of assisting Oueddei. With French assistance, Oueddei would not have to be dependent on Libya and would request their withdrawal from Chad.²³

²¹Woodward, Veil, 166.

²²Bender, Gerald, James Coleman, and Richard Sklar, ed., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1985), 241.

²³Congress, House, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October and 4 November 1981, 28, 43.

Using Habré would give the United States and its allies an indirect way of countering the Libyans. President Reagan's new CIA director, William Casey, reviewed a SECRET Special National Intelligence Estimate, titled "Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities", that outlined what Qadhafi would do in the next few months. The estimate made the following points: 1) "Qadhafi's recent success in Chad ensures that his aggressive policies will pose a growing challenge to U.S. and Western interests," 2) "opposition to his regime is poorly organized and ineffective," and 3) "Soviet objectives are served by Qadhafi's anti-Western policies." The report pointed out that "Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and France were providing increased covert support to Habré's rebellion." The main point of the estimate was that Chad was Qadhafi's Achilles heel. Casey agreed. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, agreed with using the Chad option. He saw this as a way to "bloody Qadhafi's nose" and to "increase the flow of pine boxes back to Libya."²⁴

Without Libyan intervention, the Chad situation probably would not have led to United States intervention. Libya's intervention escalated a local problem into a regional one, if not a global situation.²⁵ To help determine why the United

²⁴Woodward, Veil, 87-91. One drawback with Woodward's book is that he does not tell how he came up with his information. There are no footnotes. Quotations used to outline the estimate's points are from Veil.

²⁵Some political scientists argue that when a superpower becomes involved, the situation becomes global.

States intervened in Chad it is necessary to take a look at Libyan interests.


LIBYAN EXPANSIONISM

An appropriate title for Libyan interest in Chad may be nationalism. Libya has had an eye on Chad dating back to the reign of King Idris, and even to the Senussiyya Brotherhood. The Senussiyya Brotherhood began its expansion in the early nineteenth century from the Libyan province of Cyrenaica (see map 4) and expanded through much of the Sahara (see Map 5). It was the colonial powers that pushed the Sennusiya control back to Libya. King Idris was the grandson of the founder of the Senussiyya Brotherhood.²⁶

A reason for Libyan concern in Chad was because of the Muslims. King Idris had provided aid to the Muslims of Chad, while keeping relations with the non-Muslim Chadian government. When Colonel Qadhafi took over Libya in the 1969 coup d'état, the situation changed. Qadhafi desired to protect the Muslim population from what he considered the pagan government of Chad. Arabism and Islam were a priority and through it, Libya, with its great oil wealth, could

²⁶For more information about the Sennusiya Brotherhood, see E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949) and Nicola A. Ziadeh, Sanusiyah. A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1958; reprint, 1968).


Map 4
Libya, Chad, and the Aozou Strip



(Source: Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara, 82-3.)

Map 5

The Extent of the Senussiyya Brotherhood's Influence



(Source: Derived from Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Africa Since 1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1967; third edition, 1981; reprint 1989), 98.)

build an Islamic empire.²⁷ Extending boundaries, merging with other countries, and developing a nuclear program were all nationalistic goals of Qadhafi. It is possible that Qadhafi desired a larger area of control much like the Senussiyya once controlled.

The 1980 Libyan intervention in Chad caused State Department personnel to see Qadhafi's actions as having a strategic significance. Qadhafi has tried to create a larger Arab, or Islamic, state with the proposed mergers of other countries. When these attempts fail, he apparently has no problem using his oil wealth to influence events in target countries.²⁸ In July 1981, Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs said that "[Qadhafi's] diplomacy of subversion in Africa and the Arab world...[is] of unprecedented obstruction to our own interests and objectives."²⁹

Qadhafi started a strong buildup of the Libyan military. With an average of about eight to ten billion dollars per year in oil revenue (down from a peak of almost twenty-two

²⁷Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad, Research Series no. 45 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 1981), 119-20.

²⁸Christopher Coker, "Reagan and Africa", World Today 38, no. 4 (April 1982): 125.

²⁹Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?", International Affairs (Winter 1981/2): 17.

billion)³⁰, Libya began a massive buildup. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Libya has the highest dollar amount for military expenditure in Africa every year since 1978. During the five years preceding 1978, only Egypt and South Africa spent more than Libya. It is estimated that from 1970-85 Libyan purchases of military goods and services were twenty-nine billion dollars.³¹

Much of Libya's military equipment is stockpiled, and not maintained in adequate storage facilities. This equipment was purchased by Libya. What could so much equipment be used for, other than Libyan ideas of expansion, or strategic positioning of equipment by the Soviets? To get an idea of the vast amount of weapons held by Libya, see Chart 6. The weapon status of Algeria and Egypt provide comparison to Libya and give an indication of Libya's strength.

This force has grown rapidly since the 1969 coup. At the time of the coup, Libya had 8,500 troops, six tanks, and ninety scout cars. To match this personnel growth, Qadhafi acquired more equipment than he could use. He has about the same number of combat aircraft as France and West Germany.

³⁰Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. and London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1986), 116.

³¹Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 53.

Chart 6

Libya, Algeria, Egypt - Major Weapon Systems, 1986

	Libya	Algeria	Egypt
Population (millions)	3.6	21.2	50.0
Army - Personnel	80,000	120,000	327,000
Armor			
Tanks	3,050	954	1,639
Reconnaissance Vehicles	1,010	412	74
Armored Personnel Carriers	<1,590	<611	<3,529
Surface-to-Surface Armament			
Towed Artillery	<830	<460	<1,300
Self-Propelled Artillery	<464	180	295
Multiple Rocket Launchers	556	92	300
S-S Missile Launchers	92	18	64
Antitank Guns	<200	12	2,000
Antitank Missile Firing Sta.	<3,990	NA	1,621
Surface-to-Air Armament			
Artillery	490	400	<1,460
S-A Missile Launchers	<495	124	817
Air Force - Personnel	15,000	14,000	30,000
Aircraft			
Interceptors	277	116	175
Multirole/Tactical Support	246	90	378
Reconnaissance	16	4	32
Bombers	8	13	14
Heavy/Med. Transports	100	24	45
Training	515	173	416
Helicopters			
Attack	50	37	38
Multirole	71	68	<61
Transport & Liaison	124	8	98
Navy - Personnel	6,000	8,000	37,000
Submarines	6	2	16
Frigates	2	3	8
Corvettes	9	3	2
Missile Patrol Boats	24	17	30
Other Patrol Boats	15	6	72
ASW Helicopters	35	-	23

(Source: Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 54-55 as cited in "Military Powers", The League of Arab States 1 (1987), 57-8.)

To operate this equipment, Qadhafi has many foreigners, mainly from the East-bloc countries.³² These forces are large enough to support expansionism or threaten neighbors.

Qadhafi has attempted to unite with neighboring Arab countries. His first attempt was with Egypt in 1972. Then he tried with Tunisia in 1974, and Chad in 1981.³³ Other attempted mergers were with Sudan and Syria.³⁴ He also sought to extend his boundaries. In 1973, Libya occupied the Aozou Strip, and in 1977 it built a major military base on the recognized border between the two countries, thus exerting Libyan control beyond the old border.³⁵

Justification for occupying the Aozou strip is based on the unratified Laval-Mussolini Accords of the Treaty of Rome in 1935.³⁶ It may be that Chadian President Tombalbaye let the strip go because he had no control in the north, but more

³²"The Libyan Problem" Department of State Bulletin 83, no. 2079 (October 1983): 72.

³³Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs, 60-1.

³⁴William D. Brewer, "The Libyan-Sudanese 'Crisis' of 1981: Danger for Darfur and Dilemma for the United States," The Middle East Journal 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 211.

³⁵Lemarchand, ed., The Green and the Black, 63.

³⁶Alan Day, Border and Territorial Disputes (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1982; revised and updated 1987), 113-116. This source disputed the ownership of the Aozou Strip as previously described. It is not the purpose of this paper to determine the rightful owner. See also Bernard Lanne, Tchad-Libye: La Querelle des Frontières (Paris: Karthala, 1982), 228-238; and Guy Martin, "Security and Conflict Management in Chad", Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20, no. 4 (1989): 446-51.

likely, it may have been to get on the good side of Libya so that the Chadian government could be preserved. As stated earlier, Tombalbaye allegedly sold the Aozou Strip to Libya for money, and for the end of Libyan aid to FROLINAT. Note that the Aozou Strip extends into Niger (see Map 6). That portion of Niger is also occupied by Libya.

Libyan attempts to expand and unite are part of the reason for its interests in Chad. This may be the weak neighbor that Qadhafi can take over to build his great Saharan state. His final objective could be a direct conflict with Israel, because he and his policies are very anti-Israeli.

Qadhafi is also against the status quo, the West, and all it represents. Qadhafi inspiration is based on "an ideology that stresses 'anti-imperialism', Arab nationalism, a return to traditional Islam, and an Arab socialist revolution."³⁷ His philosophy is outlined in his Green Book.³⁸ He is against imposed European boundaries from the colonial period. He believes these boundaries were formed only for colonial interests, while they divided peoples of the same origin, such as the desert nomads. Qadhafi said that there are no ethnic divisions within the Sahara, for all of the Arabs have a common ancestry. He also said that Chad has many Arabs who

³⁷Raymond W. Copson, "African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict", Orbis 25, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 911-2.

³⁸Muammar Al-Qathafi, The Green Book.

should not be separated by these European imposed boundaries.³⁹

Qadhafi can only further his Libyan nationalism by going against the status quo. Qadhafi wants to upset the stability in the region, a stability he sees as being corrupt, unbalanced, and unhumanitarian. By upsetting the order, he can reorganize the structure in the region for his benefit.⁴⁰ Upsetting the status quo could best be accomplished through the weak link, Chad. His long-term goals in Chad include: 1) overthrowing Western influence in trans-Saharan Africa, 2) creating an Islamic state based on the Jamahiriya ideology, 3) regaining a political and cultural community, and 4) developing Chad's economy using the potential uranium and oil deposits.⁴¹

³⁹Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara, 135.

⁴⁰Kelley, A State in Disarray, 27-8.

⁴¹Ibid., 28-9.

CHAPTER THREE

The Soviet Union: A Motive for United States Intervention

Always a major concern for the United States since the beginning of the Cold War were the activities of the Soviet Union. The relationship between Colonel Qadhafi's Libya and the Soviet Union has seemed very close. It is also this relationship that may have been a reason for the United States' intervention in the Chadian Civil War. This chapter examines three areas and they are: 1) perceived Soviet expansion, 2) Libyan-Soviet relations, and 3) United States strategic interests.

Perceived Soviet Expansion

If Libya was a client or puppet of the Soviets, or even if the United States had cause to believe such a close relationship existed, the Chadian situation would take on a greater importance. As long as the balance of power is not upset, the climate between the superpowers will not be as tense. It is when the balance begins to change that there is cause for alarm, for neither side wants a smaller sphere of control or influence. Chad may very well have been such an alarm for the United States.

Globalists in the West are people who are concerned about the conflicts between smaller powers because they could grow

into a superpower confrontation. To them, it is necessary that the world order or balance of power between the superpowers be maintained. They are concerned with a new government's desire to export the revolution and whether they will seek Soviet expansion in the region.¹

This globalist view may have been the primary concern for United States' intervention. President Reagan reportedly stated, "Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't involved in this game of dominoes there wouldn't be any hotspots in the world."² Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt stated in 1980 that "Moscow's willingness and ability to exploit Third World crises have complicated U.S. efforts to maintain stability in the Third World."³

During the subcommittee hearing on the Libya-Chad-Sudan situation, René Lemarchand said in a written statement that the growing political and military ties between the Soviet Union and Libya will be perceived by the United States as Libyan subversion equals Soviet threat.⁴ The United States

¹Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner, 1989), 46, 56.

²Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character" Foreign Affairs 62, 1 (Fall 83): 5.

³Schraeder, ed., Intervention in the 1980s, 38.

⁴Congress, House, Libyan-Sudan-Chad Triangle, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October and 4 November 1981, 38.

perceived "Libyan activity in Chad and the Sudan as the instrument of aggressive, destabilizing Soviet foreign policy."⁵

The United States is concerned with Libyan goals and the possibility of Soviet expansion. Some analysts believe that the Libyans are used in Africa and the Middle East in much the same way that Cuban forces were used to support Soviet-backed military operations in Africa.⁶

Until 1972, Egypt had been in the Soviet sphere of influence. Their expulsion was a serious setback for Soviet policy in the region. The all important Suez Canal was no longer under their influence, nor was the powerful country of Egypt, which was so important in Middle Eastern politics. After 1974, Libyan-Soviet relations improved.⁷ The Soviets possibly planned these improved relations as a way of causing Egypt to reconsider its relationship with Moscow. Apparently, Soviet arms exports to Libya were a political investment designed to increase the Soviet presence in the Middle East.⁸

⁵Bender, et al., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, 332.

⁶Michael T. Klare, Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome": U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981; second printing, 1982), 130-1.

⁷This is discussed further in the next section of this chapter.

⁸Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet Arms Aid to Libya," Military Review (July 1976): 87.

The Soviet use of Libya, or vice versa, was considered by United States' military planners as a long-range strategic military threat. The huge quantities of Soviet equipment in Libya very well could be "pre-positioning" for Soviet plans. The threat of these weapons have serious implications for Western Europe and Israel. The Soviets, with this equipment and potential for air and sea base rights in Libya, could pose a greater challenge to the United States' presence in the Mediterranean.⁹

Qadhafi's objectives are counter to the United States' objectives in the Middle East. Qadhafi is for the elimination of Israel. He said to the Libyan General People's Congress that "Israel's existence conflicts with the presence of the Arab nation. Either we stay or Israel stays, anything else is nonsense."¹⁰ His support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is proof of his sincerity in this statement. Qadhafi also opposes Saudi Arabia and has called for its overthrow. He said that "the Arabs who are friends of the U.S. constitute more danger to us than Israel or the U.S."¹¹

⁹Richard Deutsch, "Dealing with Qaddafi," Africa Report (March-April 1982): 47.

¹⁰Ibid., 48. It is not the intention of this study to discuss the United States' policy concerning Israel. It is important to note that the interests of Israel through lobbies in Congress may have had an impact on the United States' intervention in Chad.

¹¹Ibid.

In a 28 October 1982 speech, Chester Crocker stated that the Soviet-bloc has supplied Africa with sixty to seventy percent of its arms and that in 1981 the United States held fifth place as an African arms supplier. He went on to explain that the threats created by the Soviets could not be ignored. It is important to act to protect United States' interests in Africa and the Middle East that are endangered by the presence of Soviets in Africa. Mr. Crocker did not say that Soviet troops were in Chad, but he did comment on the aggression by Qadhafi. Mr. Crocker also said that Qadhafi threatened Niger saying that they would be next after Chad.¹²

If Libyan expansion equals Soviet expansion, it would correspond with what was perceived as important Soviet interests. CIA reports claimed that in the early 1980's, the Soviet Union would become an oil importing nation. That helps to explain the increased Soviet presence in Ethiopia and in South Yemen.¹³

Z. Michael Szaz, Studies Program Director, American Foreign Policy Institute, identified a grand Soviet strategy

¹²Chester A. Crocker, "U.S. Response to the Challenge of Regional Security in Africa," Department of State Bulletin 82, no. 2069 (December 1982): 22-25. These comments were from a speech given before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations.

¹³Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interest in Africa: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29 October and 13, 14 November 1979., 30-1. These comments were made by Joseph J. Sisco, President of American University.

in Africa and explained it before a subcommittee hearing on Africa in 1983. He described it as consisting of a three pronged approach.

The first pincer is directed against Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti on the Horn to cut off oil traffic to Europe in a crisis and to destabilize the security of our [United States] RDF [Rapid Deployment Forces] in case of war. The second pincer is directed against South Africa by using Angola, and to a lesser extent, Mozambique. The third pincer is an indirect one, employing Libya's Qadhafi who possesses the largest depot of Soviet arms in Africa.¹⁴

Soviet expansion was also depicted in the number of Soviet-bloc personnel (including Cubans) that were in Africa in 1983. The Soviet-bloc was said to have 57,000 military personnel in Africa, as opposed to the United States' 293 active duty military personnel in Africa.¹⁵ These figures were presented before the Subcommittee on Africa to show that it was the Soviet threat that warranted an increase in United States' security assistance to Africa.

What proof is there of close ties between Libya and the Soviet Union? To answer this question, it is necessary to

¹⁴Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1984-85 (Part 8): Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Africa, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 17, 22 March and 13 April 1983, 80. This information came from a prepared statement by Z. Michael Szaz, Studies Program Director, American Foreign Policy Institute.

¹⁵Ibid., 193. This information was provided by Gerald B.H. Soloman, a New York Congressman and a member of the Subcommittee on Africa.

search for the answer beginning with the rise to power of Qadhafi in 1969.

Libyan-Soviet Relations

Soviet relations with Qadhafi's Libya may have begun at the time of Qadhafi's 1 September 1969 coup. There was a major Soviet naval exercise off the coast of Libya from 19 August to 11 September 1969. When the coup took place on 1 September, the positioning of the Soviet fleet kept any Western power, namely the British, from flying in to assist the monarchy of King Idris. The Soviets recognized the new regime in Libya on 4 September and did not end its naval exercises for another week.¹⁶ Was this just a coincidence?

In 1970, the Soviet Union delivered two shiploads of T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other vehicles to Libya¹⁷, and the East Germans had begun to provide security assistance programs. The Soviets also sought to use the bases that the Americans and the British had left that year, but Qadhafi turned them down. This was probably to keep Libya non-aligned. This developing relationship had a setback in 1972 when Qadhafi supported Sadat for expelling the Soviets from Egypt. Any possibility of establishing

¹⁶Martin Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi (London, New York, and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 102.

¹⁷Haley, Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969, 57.

stronger Libyan-Soviet ties must have appeared very distant.¹⁸ If the Soviets were to make headway on drawing Qadhafi into their sphere, it would take some time.

1974 was a significant year for Libyan-Soviet relations. After the funeral of French President Georges Pompidou in Paris in April, 1974, the Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jalloud met with Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny. This meeting appears to have started a strong relationship. Libya recognized East Germany in 1973 (maybe a signal to the Soviets after the Egyptian affair), North Korea, and Romania in 1974, and North Vietnam in 1975. These countries then began to provide military police and intelligence assistance.¹⁹

Qadhafi allowed the Soviets limited use of Libyan bases for an aid agreement. By mid 1974, the former U.S. Air Force Base at Wheelus was manned by about 1,500 Soviets, there to operate newly installed air defense batteries. Then a squadron of TU-22 Blinder C reconnaissance aircraft painted with Libyan colors began operating from bases in Libya to monitor the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.²⁰

¹⁸Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State, 102-3.

¹⁹Haley, Qadhafi and United States Foreign Policy Since 1969, 59, 67.

²⁰Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State, 103.

During 1974 through 1978, Libya increased its Soviet arms imports by fifty percent each year.²¹ It is estimated that about 1,000 Libyans were receiving military training in Soviet countries in 1974.²² "Since 1976, the Soviet Union has been constructing a huge military infrastructure in Libya, intended first and foremost for Soviet use."²³

Increased Libyan-Soviet ties were not only apparent in the military arena. Libya also appears to have attempted to help the Soviet economically. In 1976, Libya made plans with Fiat, the Italian automobile company, to invest \$415 million. The Fiat chairman, Giovanni Agnelli, flew to Moscow to meet Qadhafi. Although Agnelli denied it, the Italian Communist party newspaper, L'Unita, claimed that Fiat would now start projects in the Soviet Union. It was also reported that Soviet officials attended this meeting.²⁴

Soviet military advisors went into Chad with Libyan troops in 1980 to support Oueddei in his takeover of the country. Reportedly, these Soviet advisors even planned the

²¹Haley, Qaddafi and the United States Foreign Policy Since 1969, 62, 64-6 as cited in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December, 1980).

²²Kelley, A State in Disarray, 114.

²³Yosef Bodansky, "Soviet Military Presence in Libya," Armed Forces Journal International (November 1980): 89.

²⁴Haley, Qaddafi and United States Foreign Policy, 68-9 as cited in Facts on File, 25 December 1976, p. 964-5.

operation.²⁵ After Oueddei had secured the country from Habré, the Soviets assisted Oueddei's Libyan-backed government.²⁶

It was at this point that Qadhafi attempted to unite Chad and Libya. This caused alarm in Africa and the United States. Egypt and Sudan labelled Qadhafi's activities as Soviet expansionism and the new administration of President Reagan took action.

United States Strategic Interests and Continued Libyan-Soviet Relations

Ronald Reagan's landslide victory appeared to be a mandate to restore America's prestige in the world. His victory came on the heels of the taking of American diplomats as hostages in Iran in November, 1979 and the intervention of the Soviet military in Afghanistan in December, 1979. World events indicated that Soviet expansionism was on the increase and the Reagan administration's goal was to "roll back"²⁷ this

²⁵Brian L. Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (London, New York, and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1990): 39.

²⁶Kelley, A State in Disarray, 119.

²⁷This "roll back" of the Soviet threat was another step in the progression of the theoretical evolution of policies to counter the Soviets. First, there was the approach spurred by MacKinder's "Heartland Theory", followed by Spykman's "Rimland Theory". See Halford J. MacKinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable and Company, Limited, 1919; Pelican Books, 1944) and Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942). This evolution of Soviet containment then took the form of intervention to stop the "domino effect" that was prevalent

Soviet threat. Libya was thought to be a Soviet puppet and the Libyan-backed Chadian government and the proposed unification of the countries was viewed as Soviet expansionism.²⁸ This Chadian situation would be one of the first actions to "roll back" the threat and to possibly oust Qadhafi at the same time. The CIA began covert support to Habré as a way of protecting United States' interests.

It was apparent from statements by both President Reagan and then Secretary of State Alexander Haig that Libya was considered a Soviet puppet. Thus, Libya's activities were perceived as being made for the benefit of the Soviets. On 4 March 1981, in response to a question about the prospect of an American-Soviet summit, President Reagan said that "it would make it a lot easier if the imperialism of Soviet surrogates were to be moderated." His example was "Qadhafi in Chad."²⁹ Secretary of State Haig said that the administration sees Libya as a Soviet satellite.³⁰

in the Vietnam era. When President Reagan took office, it appears the United States moved to a "roll back" theory that was not only to directly oppose Soviet expansion, but to try and roll it back. Chad became part of the "roll back" plan in Africa.

²⁸ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 193.

²⁹Ibid., 155 as quoted in the New York Times, 5 March 1981.

³⁰Ibid. as cited by H.M.L. Beri, "Libya-U.S. Relations," Strategic Analysis (January 1981): 554.

Tensions increased between the United States and Libya as Libyan relations with the Soviets continued. In April, 1981, Qadhafi visited the Soviet Union and that same month Libya loaned \$100 million to Nicaragua. They were also supporting the El Salvadoran guerrillas. President Reagan condemned these acts and noted that Qadhafi's support for communism in the Western Hemisphere was for the purpose of harming the United States.³¹

Qadhafi said that the Soviet Union "realized that Libya and Chad represent a serious threat to imperialist interests in the African continent."³² In June, 1981, Libyan Prime Minister Major Jalloud went to Moscow and signed an agreement on economic cooperation. Le Monde claimed that Jalloud's purpose was to insure that Moscow would back Libya in the event of war with Egypt and Sudan.³³

Shortly after, in July, two Soviet warships made the first ever visit to a Libyan port. Then, a Soviet Tupolev T-26 Backfire-B long range bomber flew from a base near the Black Sea to Kufra. Although the visit was very short, the significance was great. The bomber utilized the five mile

³¹Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya, 40.

³²ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya, 147-8 as quoted in Qadhafi's interview with Al-Walam (Kuwait), April 19, 1981, FBIS, 4 May 1981, p. Q-4.

³³Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 14, (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, a division of Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981), B-64.

long runway at Kufra. Egypt's defense minister, Lieutenant General Mohammed Abu-Ghazala, said, "Why did the Libyans build a base with five miles of runway unless they are going to be used by some other people? They don't have any such airplanes for the Libyans to fly."³⁴ This visit marked stronger ties for the Soviets in Libya and posed a new threat to NATO's southern flank.³⁵

In August, 1981, the United States' Sixth Fleet conducted maneuvers in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf of Sidra (see Map 3) which Qadhafi claimed as his own. Maybe the maneuvers were to encourage a confrontation with Qadhafi, since in 1973 and 1980, Libyan jets fired on U.S. planes. During these 1981 maneuvers, Libyan aircraft flew over one hundred sorties to counter the Americans, but never fired. Then on 19 August two Libyan aircraft fired on two American fighters. The fight ended with the downing of the two Libyan aircraft.³⁶

The result of the confrontation was Libya's immediate signing of a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet allies of Ethiopia and South Yemen. Qaddafi threatened to join the

³⁴Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York and Canada: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 240. Abu-Ghazala's statement came from an interview he had with Benjamin F. Schemmer in "The U.S. Has Lost a Lot of Years," Armed Forces Journal International, (September 1981), 50-1.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Davis, Qaddafi. Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya, 47.

Warsaw Pact if attacked again by the United States.³⁷ Qadhafi also purchased even more Soviet equipment than had already been negotiated, increased his efforts to overthrow Sadat of Egypt and Nimieri of Sudan, and threatened retaliation on the United States.³⁸ One other important factor was that the United States was able to measure the Soviet reaction to the incident.

On 6 October 1981 President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated, but the United States was unable to find a direct link to Libya. Qadhafi was overjoyed and called for the same thing to happen to President Nimieri of Sudan, while, at the same time, Libyan planes were bombing Sudanese border villages. Just before Sadat's death, Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak had presented plans for a joint Egyptian-Sudanese attack on Libyan forces in Chad. The Reagan administration promised to take care of the Soviets if Egypt and Libya went to war. This attack never did occur, but in November the U.S. participated in maneuvers in Egypt called

³⁷ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Africa, 147-8.

³⁸Skinner, ed., Beyond Constructive Engagement, 94-5. See also ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Africa, 149. This retaliation also included threats on NATO. In Qadhafi's 1 September 1981 anniversary of the revolution speech, he said, "We warn the peoples of Western Europe, and in particularly the people of Sicily and Crete, the peoples of Greece and Turkey, that the U.S., which is playing with fire, will cause a disaster for these people." This led some to believe that Libya now had SS-12 Soviet nuclear capable missiles with a 500 mile range that could strike those places listed above.

Operation Bright Star and had two AWACS fly the border area of Egypt and Libya.³⁹

The Libyan-Soviet relations continued after the incident. A Libyan source in 1983 reported the number of Soviet-bloc personnel in Libya to be 18,592 Poles; 9,003 Bulgarians; 6,526 Soviets; 5,652 East Germans; 5,407 Czechs, and 1,692 Hungarians.⁴⁰ Libya relied on a large number of Syrian, Pakistani, and North Korean pilots to man its air force.⁴¹

Qadhafi did not seem to be totally aligned with the Soviets despite the large quantities of Soviet equipment and personnel in Libya or the other support he received from them. In 1983, the Soviets did not sign the Soviet-Libyan Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. The Soviets never did intervene on behalf of Qadhafi when he tangled with the United States. Maybe, the relationship was economic and with the fall of the world oil prices in the early 1980's, Qadhafi no longer had the funds to continue his level of activities. A 1986 article in the Washington Post, if true, gave an indication of the relations between Qadhafi and the Soviet Union. It stated that:

³⁹Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya, 478.

⁴⁰Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State, 105. This information was reported by the Libyan Al-Muntajun on 15 January 1983.

⁴¹Harris, Libya, 73.

CIA reports, including intercepted communications compiled before the U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, indicate that the Soviets would like to replace the volatile Qaddafi with the man who has been protecting their interests inside Libya's revolutionary regime. He is Qaddafi's No.2 man, Abdul Salaam Jalloud.

According to one intercepted message, the Soviets are "looking forward to Qaddafi's downfall." Another top secret CIA report quotes a high Soviet military official as saying, in a private conversation, that Qaddafi is a "madman on top of a pile of gold." The reference presumably is to the black gold under Libya's desert sands.⁴²

What interests are threatened by Libyan intervention in Chad? In Chad, there is nothing that is produced that the United States needs. Potential in oil and minerals may exist, but there was nothing being produced then that would cause the United States to intervene.⁴³ Losing markets or potential markets in Chad would not affect the United States economically either.

American interests include the minerals of Africa South of the Sahara. "For those who fear a Soviet or insurgent threat to Western mineral supplies, no area is of greater concern than [Africa South of the Sahara]. The region...now supplies much of the West's cobalt, manganese, chromium and platinum."⁴⁴

⁴²Sicker, The Making of a Pariah State, 109-10 as quoted from the article by Jack Anderson and Joseph Spear in the Washington Post, 24 April 1986.

⁴³This subject of minerals and oil is discussed in the next chapter.

⁴⁴Klare, Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome", 56-7.

Another interest of the United States, as was mentioned in the speech by Secretary of State Schultz, are the trade routes or oil routes. To get Mid East oil to the United States, the oil tankers must pass through certain choke points.⁴⁵ These choke points are strategically important to the United States and the West because of the degree of dependency on oil. Map 6 depicts these choke points.

In a prepared statement, Mr. Crocker pointed out the geographic importance of Africa to the United States. He said that the continent is "in the way"⁴⁶ of routes to other areas with a higher priority: "the NW Quadrant of the Indian Ocean, including [the] Persian Gulf and [the] Red Sea-Arabian Peninsula."⁴⁷


To sum it up, the United States' interests in Africa were to protect African oil and mineral supplies, guard oil and trade routes of the African coast, and support African allies, among other things. Chad was seen as a way to show

⁴⁵Chester Crocker, while he was the director of African Studies at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, defined choke points as "a point where a route becomes very narrow because of the seas and currents." He provided this definition before a House hearing on "U.S. Interests in Africa." See Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interests in Africa: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29 October and 13, 14 November 1979, 140.

⁴⁶These quotes were placed in his statement. See Congress, House, U.S. Interests in Africa, 130-3.

⁴⁷Ibid.

Map 6
African Choke Points



(Source: Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs, 109.)

United States' resolve, short of sending in troops, to guard these interests that were threatened by the Libyans, to the advantage of the Soviets.

Conclusion

This global view of the situation appears to be the overriding factor for increased aid to Africa, and the United States' intervention in Chad. The Soviet threat in Africa was so real in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Libya, even if it was not a Soviet surrogate, would create in Chad an opportunity for the Soviet Union to expand and hurt United States and Western interests. Egypt and Sudan are important to the United States' foreign policy and their protection was vital, thus the rationale for intervention in the Chadian Civil War.

CHAPTER FOUR

Chad's Minerals and Oil: A Motive for United States Intervention

Another possibility for the United States' intervention in Chad may be because of the suspected potential in mineral and oil deposits. Part of the reason may also be to keep these suspected deposits out of Libyan control. Because of the civil war and the extremely poor infrastructure, exploration of potential mineral and oil deposits has been limited.

URANIUM

In 1957, the French Geologic and Mineral Research Bureau reported the presence of uranium and other minerals in the Aozou Strip.¹ Niger, the country west of Chad, has one of the richest deposits of uranium in the world. In fact, "Niger is the world's fourth largest producer of uranium and produces about 4,000 metric tons of uranium oxide annually."² The geography of its uranium producing area in its northeastern section is very similar to that of the western part of the

¹Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara, 144.

²U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan. Report prepared by Warren H. Donnelly, 97th Cong., 1st sess., January 1982, p. 12.

section is very similar to that of the western part of the Aozou Strip. Chad's potential in uranium also extends southward from the Aozou Strip into the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) area.³ Another radioactive element, thorium, has been discovered, along with uranium, in Ennedi (see Map 2).⁴ This potential in uranium had to be of interest to Libya who has a very active nuclear development program.

Because of the timing of the Libyan annexation of the Aozou Strip, it appeared that the move was largely due to the suspected uranium deposits in the area. The European Nuclear Energy Agency thought the deposits, even though low-grade and high cost, were good enough to fulfill Libya's nuclear independence. This, of course, was at the same time as the agreement with the Soviet Union to build a nuclear reactor in Libya.⁵

Libya claims that its reason for developing nuclear energy is to provide energy for the country when its oil reserves run out. There are problems for Libya's nuclear program and one is that there does not seem to be any concentrated uranium deposits in Libya.⁶ In 1980, the CIA estimated that, at Libya's rate of acquiring uranium, they

³Kelley, A State in Disarray, 36.

⁴Worldmark Encyclopedia, Africa, 64.

⁵Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, 114.

⁶Congress, House, Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1982, 12, 31.

would not have enough to create a bomb until 1990. Qadhafi "was stepping up his plans to get a nuclear weapon."⁷

In 1980, the Soviets delivered eleven kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Libya.⁸ Most of Libya's uranium came in the form of yellowcake from Niger. French and United States intelligence believed that Libya bought tons of the uranium-rich yellowcake in 1980. After the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor by Israel in 1981, Niger released a list of those countries to which it had sold uranium during the first half of that year. During this time, Iraq was listed as buying 100 tons, while Libya had purchased 1,212 tons and France 2,293 tons.⁹

It takes more than just uranium to build a nuclear capability, and Qadhafi pursued this endeavor aggressively. In 1974, Argentina agreed to train Libyan chemists to extract and purify uranium, and to provide equipment for the prospecting of radioactive materials. Libya also hired nuclear scientists; sent students to study in the West, including the United States; built a nuclear research center in Tajura; and hired the Soviets and Belgians to help build

⁷Woodward, Veil, 177.

⁸Ibid. This is another indicator of close Libyan-Soviet ties.

⁹Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, 202-4.

nuclear energy facilities.¹⁰ The United States later convinced Belgium to cancel the contract. Another report stated that a West German firm tested a rocket in Libya.¹¹ In 1975, Libya offered to buy the Pakistani nuclear program.¹² The analysis of Libya's nuclear capability by the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control reported that Libya would have only a small nuclear weapon potential by the early 1990's unless the Libyans acquired engineers and technicians experienced in the production of nuclear materials.¹³

This subcommittee report states that Libya needed experts to make nuclear weapons and it seems that obtaining the uranium was not the problem. This may be the case, but with potential for Chadian uranium in the Tibesti mountains of the Aozou Strip, Chad would be helpful to the Libyan nuclear program. Then, just across the border are the rich uranium deposits of Niger. In the early 1980's, Libya's oil revenues fell, and fortunately, for Qadhafi, he had already occupied the Aozou Strip and an adjacent portion of Niger. He could possibly mine his own uranium without purchasing it.

¹⁰Harris, Libya, Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State, 91-2.

¹¹Woodward, Veil, 177.

¹²Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, 202.

¹³Congress, House, Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1982, 39.

MINERALS

Other mineral resources in Chad include natron (used locally only), the natural form of sodium carbonate, which is primarily north of Lake Chad. Quartz and gold deposits have been located in the Ouaddai area.¹⁴ Tungsten, cassiterite, and bauxite have also been identified in the north.¹⁵

Of these minerals, tungsten and bauxite are considered critical by the United States. Tungsten is critical because it improves the performance of other materials through alloying. Bauxite, used to make aluminum, is critical because of the great quantities needed to satisfy the United States' consumption.¹⁶

While suspected deposits of these minerals are believed to be in Chad, there is no indication that the potential would have had any influence on the United States' intervention. Mining companies would also face the burden of operating in a landlocked country with an extremely poor infrastructure.

OIL

Chad does appear to have potential in oil. The area north of Lake Chad has oil reserves estimated at seventy

¹⁴Worldmark Encyclopedia, Africa, 64.

¹⁵Africa South of the Sahara 1990, 370.

¹⁶Correspondence dated 15 August 1990 from Thomas P. Dolley. He works in the Branch of Africa and the Middle East, Division of International Minerals, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior.

million tons.¹⁷ The Continental Oil Company, CONOCO, was granted a concession in 1969 to explore for oil. CONOCO was joined in Chadian exploration by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Exxon, and Chevron. In 1973, drilling began with fourteen wells in the Chari basin and seven in the Lake Chad Basin.¹⁸ In 1979/80, CONOCO and Shell produced about 1,500 barrels per day. Although this was a small amount, it did provide for approximately eighty percent of the oil needs of Chad.¹⁹

CONOCO predicted in a 1983 report that Chad could be self-sufficient in oil.²⁰ Being oil self-sufficient would be important for any country, but in Chad this does not represent much when compared to the industrialized nations. About 1980, oil exploration and production stopped due to the civil war and the falling world oil prices.

Currently Exxon, Shell, and Chevron have formed a consortium to operate in Chad. They are now conducting a feasibility study on their data of Chad's oil resources.²¹ In 1984, Exxon estimated oil reserves in Chad to be ten

¹⁷Africa South of the Sahara 1990, 371. This source did not state who made this estimate, when it was made, or indicate the estimated oil reserves for the entire country.

¹⁸Kelley, A State in Disarray, 36.

¹⁹Africa South of the Sahara 1990, 371.

²⁰Kelley, A State in Disarray, 36.

²¹Phone conversation on 14 May 1990 at 1400 hours with Mr. John Kelly, a Public Relations official for Exxon International.

million tons and was spending fifty thousand dollars per day drilling.²² Chevron holds a twenty-five percent interest in twenty-six million acres in southern and western Chad, as shown on Map 7. They drilled three successful exploratory wells in 1989. Also, two wells were established in the Sediği field to provide oil to a new refinery in N'Djamena. Chevron's plans for 1990 in Chad include more exploratory wells.²³ A small 5,000 barrel per day oil refinery was due to be completed in 1990.²⁴ Map 7 depicts the Exxon-Chevron-Shell Consortium's leased land for oil exploration in Chad.

CONCLUSION

Considering the potential for minerals and oil in Chad as a reason for United States intervention, there are some possibilities. These possibilities revolve around uranium, critical minerals, and oil. Libya's access to uranium would be easier if it were able to get it from the Aozou Strip.


²²Mario J. Azevedo and Gwendolyn Prater, "Foreign Assistance and Dependence: Post-Colonial Chad (1960-1985)," Journal of African Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 108.

²³Chevron Corporation, Supplement to the 1989 Annual Report (March 1990), 33. Exxon and Shell officials did not provide information about the suspected reserve size or comment on the feasibility study or the information it was based on. This information from Chevron is provided in their annual report, but did not go into any details.

²⁴Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, Africa (New York: Worldmark Press, Ltd., 1988), 64.

Map 7

The Exxon, Chevron, and Shell Consortium's
Leased Land for Drilling in Chad



(Source: Derived from Chevron Corporation, Supplement to the 1989 Annual Report (March 1990), 33.)

According to the report by the House Subcommittee on Arms Control, Libya's nuclear weapons development is in greater need of experienced personnel with radioactive materials, than in obtaining uranium. Libyan nuclear weapon development was a concern of the United States. After the annexation of the Aozou Strip, Libya could be independent in uranium, if the suspected uranium reserves did exist.²⁵

Potential in tungsten and bauxite deposits can not be taken seriously because no deposits have been discovered. There is only the potential for these reserves. While there is concern by the United States for obtaining needed minerals, this is not the reason for intervention.

The oil potential is there. But the oil information available on the reserves suggests that there is only enough to meet the needs of Chad. Because of the costs involved in locating and producing oil, as well as the mineral resources, large multinational corporations would have to be involved. There does exist debate on the relation of the multinational corporations and the government in respect to foreign policy, but given the limited information on resource potential in Chad, pursuing this line of logic does not seem practical.

²⁵There was no evidence found during this study indicating that there was ever an attempt to limit Libya's acquiring low grade uranium.

CONCLUSION

Internal events in Chad did not cause the United States to intervene. From the beginning of the Chadian Civil War in 1965 until the Libyan military intervention in 1980, the United States seemed to have no reason to become involved in the conflict.

The late United States intervention in the Chadian Civil War greatly downplays the significance of the potential in Chadian oil, uranium, and other minerals. The building of the oil refinery near N'Djamena with a capacity to refine 5,000 barrels per day does not lend great credence to the oil potential. Uranium, even though it may possibly exist in great quantities in the Libyan-occupied Aozou Strip, is supposedly not the hindrance to Libya producing nuclear weapons. But, according to the report Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan in 1982, Libya needed experienced personnel in the production of nuclear materials to develop its nuclear weapon capability, not uranium. The other suspected mineral deposits do not seem sufficient motivation for the intervention either. It is because of this oil and mineral outlook that any connection between big business and its possible influence on United States intervention was omitted.

Libya is the obvious reason, and the trigger for United States intervention with military aid. Traditionally, France

handles situations in Africa in former colonial areas where it has influence. In the Chad case, France intervened three times with troops to support its favored faction. Egypt and Sudan, allies of the United States, were also supporting their favored faction, which at times seemed to be at odds with French support. It was not until Goukoni Oueddei and his Libyan backed forces took over Chad that the United States became greatly concerned. Qadhafi's unsuccessful attempt to unite the countries added to the fears of Egypt, Sudan, France, and others. The United States acted as Egypt and Sudan wanted, which was by supporting the anti-Libyan Chadian leader, Habré.

Libyan expansionism, terrorism, and destabilization policies touched on the moral, legal, and strategic principles that are considered when deciding on intervention. The new Reagan administration wanted to rebuild the tarnished image of the United States. By countering Qadhafi in this way, the United States' image could be restored by supporting its strategically important allies of Egypt and Sudan. It could stop the occupation of Chad by Libya and end Libyan expansionism. Other governments in Africa and elsewhere could find comfort in Qadhafi's being put in his place for attempting to change the status quo through destabilization policies. Finally, the image of a superpower being unable to act against terrorism would be dashed.

Colonel Qadhafi, the crux of the problem, was the primary objective. The United States wanted him to realize that he could not act in these ways and get away with it. He had to be brought to realize that his oil wealth did not give him the right to cause chaos in this region or the world. United States military power made the point that it could not put up with current Libyan policies. This point was made in the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident and the 1986 air strike on Colonel Qadhafi's Tripoli residence.

Then there is the Soviet threat. The Soviet Union was perceived as a growing threat when President Reagan took office. Something had to be done. President Reagan greatly increased the defense budget and sought to "roll back" the Soviet advances. The United States believed that the Soviet Union profited from Libya's control of Chad.

Since the 1969 coup that replaced King Idris with Colonel Qadhafi, the Soviets have had a special relationship with Libya. The question is: How close a relationship did Colonel Qadhafi have with the Soviet Union? Certain actions would cause the United States to perceive the relationship to be very close, but maybe not close enough for Libya to be considered a puppet. The eleven kilograms of highly enriched uranium delivered in 1980 to Libya, the use of Soviet-bloc fighter pilots, the Soviet advisors that participated in the Chadian war, the positioning of top of the line Soviet equipment in Libya, and the staging of Soviet aircraft to

observe the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean all lead to the feeling that Libyan threat equals Soviet threat.

Evidence released by the CIA cast doubts on the relationship, indicating that the Soviets would like to replace Colonel Qadhafi with Major Jalloud. Also, it is interesting to note that no mention was given of any Soviet satellite intelligence being supplied to Libyan troops at any time. Possibly this information is unavailable or just not known. One other major point is that the Soviet Union never did take any significant act to counter United States actions against Libya.

This leaves the strategic issue of the Libyan-Soviet relationship. If Libyan expansion equalled Soviet expansion, this strategic concern would be an excellent reason for United States intervention. Libya opposed Egypt, Sudan, and even Saudi Arabia. Without friendly pro-United States governments in these countries, certain strategic choke points would be in jeopardy. These points would be the Suez canal and the Horn, important for the Western oil flow. Saudi Arabian oil, a definite strategic interest, would also be jeopardized.

An interesting topic in this discussion is the power of the Israeli lobby. Of course, Libya did not want to maintain the status quo and wanted to eliminate the country of Israel. Colonel Qadhafi is known for his anti-Israeli position, so it only makes sense that Israel would be against Libya.

It is the contention of the author that United States intervention with security assistance was primarily due to the perceived Soviet threat. Because Libya was the catalyst for the destabilization in the region, it was in the United States' interest to assist in stopping Libya. If the Libyans were not checked, the strategic interests in both Africa and the Middle East would be jeopardized and the balance of power could be shifted to a Soviet advantage. That potential was sufficient for intervention.

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